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Abstract
Today’s economy, production activity, and our life are sustained by social and technological
network infrastructures, while new threats of network attacks by destructing loops have been found
recently in network science. We inversely take into account the weakness, and propose a new design
principle for incrementally growing robust networks. The networks are self-organized by enhancing
interwoven long loops. In particular, we consider the range-limited approximation of linking by
intermediations in a few hops, and show the strong robustness in the growth without degrading
efficiency of paths. Moreover, we demonstrate that the tolerance of connectivity is reformable even
from extremely vulnerable real networks according to our proposed growing process with some
investment. These results may indicate a prospective direction to the future growth of our network
infrastructures.
PACS numbers: 05.65.+b, 89.75.Fb, 89.20.-a, 05.10.-a
Keywords: coexistence of efficiency and robustness, onion-like structure, long-distance relations, interwoven
loops, unselfish self-organization
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I. INTRODUCTION
Social and technological networks for communication, collaboration, trading, travel, or
supply chain become more and more important, since their systems support our daily life
and economy. The connections between nodes facilitate information deliveries, physical
logistics, and energy supplies. Moreover, through some intermediations, the connections
sometimes lead to new business chances, acquaintanceship, or remote control of the infras-
tructures efficiently. Some case studies in organization theory: the rapid recovery of Toyota
group’s supply chain from a large fire accident of their subcontract plants [14, 15], world-
wide economic networks with expanding business chances by Wenzhou people in China [15],
and the brain circulation system known as Silicon Valley (SV) model for developing innova-
tional high-tech industry with market opportunities by immigrant engineers [19] has been
suggested the importance of long-distance relations for both robustness of connectivity and
efficiency of path in a network. The established connections via intermediations probably
work well for managing cross-border operations.
On the other hand, many social, technological, and biological infrastructural networks
have a common scale-free (SF) structure [2] generated by the selfish preferential attach-
ment referred to as rich-get-richer rule in consciously/unconsciously considering efficiency
of paths between two nodes connected within a few hops. The SF networks also have an
extreme vulnerability against intentional attacks [1]. However, in these several years by
percolation analyses, it has been clarified that onion-like topological structure with positive
degree-degree correlations gives the optimal robustness even for the attacks in SF networks
[20, 21]. Based on a natural but unselfish rule, onion-like networks can be incrementally
grown by applying cooperative partial copying and adding shortcut [6, 7] instead of the
expensive whole rewiring [24] or hierarchically expanding outer ring [18] for enhancing the
positive degree-degree correlations. One of the drawback is that the robustness is weak in
early stage of the growth [7]. While none of incremental generation of networks has been so
far based on interwoven loops, new threats of network attacks by destructing loops have been
found recently [11, 12]. They give severer damage than the conventional intentional attacks
[1], and can be easily performed. One is Collective Influence (CI) attack [11] considered for a
global optimization to identifying the most influence nodes called influencers in information
spreading. Another is Belief Propagation (BP) attack [12] derived from a message-passing
2
approximation algorithm rooted by the spin glass model in statistical physics for the Feed-
back Vertex Set (FVS) problem in belonging to NP-hard [8, 9].
Inversely taking into account the weakness caused by the CI and BP attacks, we propose
a new design principle for generating robust onion-like networks in focusing on enhancing of
long loops, whose key factor is long-distance relation inspired from the organization theory
[15]. Furthermore, we consider a practical approximation of the network generation with
moderately long loops, which is based on range-limited intermediations for finding linked
nodes without large costs or efforts in the growth.
II. SELF-ORGANIZED GROWING NETWORK BY A PAIR OF ATTACH-
MENTS
We propose a self-organized growing network by enhancing long loops. After explaining
the basic model, we consider the realistic range-limited approximation in 2.1. We estimate
the degree distribution in our proposed network in 2.2.
A. Basic model and the practical approximation
We explain a basic model of self-organized growing network by enhancing long loops. At
each time step of growing, a new node is added and connects to existing nodes. As the
connection rule for even number m links emanated from the new node, we introduce a pair
of attachments referred to as random and long distance attachments (RLD-A) or preferential
and long distance attachments (PLD-A). The difference of the connection rule from that in
the well-known Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model [2] is a pair of attachments with long distance
attachment. As shown in Fig. 1a, the following pair of attachments is repeated in m/2
times at each time step.
RLD-A: One of link destination is uniformly randomly chosen as encountering, and another
link destination is the furthest node from the chosen node. When there are several
candidates of the furthest with a same distance counted by hops, one of them is
randomly selected. Some kind of randomness is useful to avoid fixed weak-points in
the growth.
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PLD-A: For the comparison with RLD-A, instead of uniformly random selection, one of
the pair is preferentially chosen node with a probability proportional to its degree [2].
Another link destination is the furthest node from the preferentially chosen node.
For attached even number m links, m/2 loops through the pair of nodes are created at each
time step. The interwoven loops via new node are significant for m ≥ 4 as shown in Sections
3 and 4. The minimum m = 4 is corresponded to the least effort of attachment linking to
be strongly robust network in our growing method. Such connection rule in Fig. 1a was
not noticed because of the lack of emphasis on loops, but the importance of the part of long
distance relation was covertly suggested in organization theory [15].
Moreover, since range-limited approach is useful for efficiently investigating global prop-
erty of network such as influencer [11], centrality [3], or random percolation [17], we apply
it for generating robust networks. We consider a range-limited approximation of RLD-A as
random and intermediated attachments (MED).
MED: Instead of the furthest node, we select a distant node to the extent of a few hops
via intermediations from the randomly chosen pair node. Intermediations in one hop
mean attachments to the 2nd neighbors of the randomly chosen node, intermediations
in two hops mean ones to the 3rd neighbors, and intermediations in µ hops mean ones
to the µ+1-th neighbors. When µ is small, the attachments to a few hops-th neighbors
have reality without large connection costs or efforts.
If a same destination node in RLD-A, PLD-A, or MED is chosen, other selection of pair is
tried due to the prohibition of multiple links between two nodes.
B. Estimation of degree distribution
We consider growing networks with a same condition of the total number M = m(N −
m) +m(m − 1)/2 of links for size N : total number of nodes at time step t = N −m. As
the initial configuration, we set a complete graph of N0 = m nodes and M0 = m(m − 1)/2
links at t = 0. Figure 1b shows onion-like structure in which older nodes form the core while
younger nodes surround it. Figure 2c justifies that older nodes get more links. Moreover, we
can derive exponential tails of degree distributions p(k) by the asymptotic approximation
[10] as follows. The invariant ordering kn(t) < kn−1(t) < . . . < k1(t) hold for large t in
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FIG. 1: Topological properties of the proposed networks. a) In the case of m = 4, there are two
pairs of attachments represented by green and blue lines from a new node added at each time step.
The green node is at the end of the longest path represented by dashed-line in the shortest paths
counted by hops from the blue node. The furthest node is easily findable by a labeling method.
Once a link is generated, it is undirected. In PLD-A, the destination node of blue line is chosen
with a probability proportional to its degree, instead of random selection in RLD-A. In MED, the
destination node of green line is chosen in the µ + 1-th neighbors from the blue node, instead of
the furthest node in RLD-A. b) Example of onion-like structure by RLD-A for m = 4 at N = 200.
The circle size of node is proportional to its degree. The structure is visualized at the positions as
node degrees become smaller from core to peripheral.
parallel curves in Fig. 2c. Since the time course of degree of node i follows ki(t) ∼ log(t)/β
as a monotone increasing function of t with a constant β > 0, we obtain
ti
t
=
eβki
eβki(t)
,
p(ki(t) < k) = p
(
ti >
eβki
eβk
t
)
=
(
1−
eβki
eβk
)
t
N0 + t
,
p(k) =
∂p((ki(t) < k)
∂k
∼ e−βk.
Indeed, the orange and cyan lines guide log(t) and 2 log(t) in Fig. 2c, the estimated same
color lines of e−k and e−k/2 are fitting with the tails of p(k) in Fig. 2a. The largest degree
is bounded around 20 ∼ 35 without heavy connection load as on hub nodes in SF structure
of many real networks. Figure 2b shows that the range-limited cases of MED in µ = 2, 3, 4
intermediations have slightly deviated but similar exponential tails of p(k).
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a) p(k) by RLD-A b) p(k) by MED
c) ki(t) by RLD-A
FIG. 2: Estimation of exponential tail of degree distribution. a) Degree distribution p(k) in the
average over 100 samples of our networks at N = 5000. Thin orange and cyan lines guide the
exponential tails. b) the cases of MED for µ = 2, 3, 4. c) Time course of degree ki(t) of node i in
the average over 100 samples of our networks. The thick lines from top to bottom (red, green, light
blue for m = 4, or cyan, yellow, blue for m = 2) denote ki(t) of node i = 1, 10, and 100 inserted at
the birth times ti = i−m > 0. Thin orange and cyan lines guide O(log(t)).
III. STRONG ROBUSTNESS AND THE SMALL-WORLD EFFECT
For our proposed networks, we investigate the robustness index
R
def
=
1
N
1∑
q=1/N
S(q),
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a) RLD-A or PLD-A for m = 4 b) BA for m = 4
c) RLD-A or PLD-A for m = 2
FIG. 3: Robustness in the growing networks. Robustness index R against HDA, CI3, and BP
attacks vs size N in our networks by a) RLD-A or PLD-A, b) SF networks by BA model for
m = 4, and c) RLD-A or PLD-A for m = 2.
where S(q) denotes the number of nodes included in the giant component (GC as the largest
cluster) after removing qN nodes, q is a fraction of removed nodes by High Degree Adaptive
(HDA), CI for l = 3 layer [11], and BP [12] attacks. As in Appendix or [11, 12], the highest
value of CIl(i) in Eq. (4) or q
0
i in Eqs. (5)-(8) to be removed is recalculated after each
node removal. Note that the maximum R ≥ 0 is 0.5 in general. The following results are
insensitive for varying values of inverse temperature x = 7 and 100 rounds of the message-
passing [12], and there is no difference for l ≥ 3 in CI attacks. Figure 3a shows that our
networks by RLD-A for m = 4 have strong robustness R > 0.3 even in the early stage of
growth, while Figure 3b shows that R is lower in the conventional SF networks by BA model.
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a) RLD-A or PLD-A for m = 4 b) BA for m = 4
c) RLD-A, PLD-A, BA for m = 2
FIG. 4: Relative size S(q)/N vs fraction q of removed nodes in the networks by a) RLD-A, PLD-
A, b) BA for m = 4, and c) RLD-A, PLD-A, BA for m = 2 at N = 5000. The reddish curves
against HDA attacks are gradually decreased, while bluish ones against BP attacks are suddenly
dropped. The yellow-greenish or black curves against CI3 attacks are the intermediate. Note that
R is defined by the area under the line of S(q)/N .
The networks by PLD-A show the intermediate R values. In Fig. 3c for m = 2, these lines
fall in overall, but it is invariant that the ordering of damage by attacks is BP > CI3 >
HDA whose differences are very small. Each value of R is almost constant in the growing
at least from the initial complete graph. In the range-limited cases of MED in µ = 2, 3, 4
intermediations, we obtain 0.31 < R < 0.35 and 0.28 < R < 0.34 against HDA and BP
attacks, respectively. Figure 4ab show the relative size S(q)/N with the sudden breakdowns
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a) RLD-A, PLD-A, and BA b) RLD-A and MED
FIG. 5: Degree-degree correlations in the growing networks. Assortativity r as the measure of
correlations for size N in comparison with the networks by a) RLD-A, PLD-A, and BA model for
m = 2 or m = 4, b) RLD-A and MED0∼4 for m = 4. MED0 ∼ 4 denote the case of MED for
µ = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4.
by BP attacks (bluish lines) as mentioned in [12]. Each of the robustness in Fig. 4ab for
m = 4 is improved from the corresponding one in Fig. 4c for m = 2, although larger m
requires more links.
We also investigate the assortativity −1 ≤ r ≤ 1 as the Pearson correlation coefficient
for degrees [13].
r
def
=
4M
∑
e(kek
′
e)− [
∑
e(ke + k
′
e)]
2
2M
∑
e(k
2
e + k
′2
e )− [
∑
e(ke + k
′
e)]
2 ,
where ke and k
′
e denote degrees at both end-nodes of link e, M is the total number of links.
Figure 5a shows that our networks by RLD-A for m = 4 (red line) have high assortativity
r > 0.2 as similar to the copying model [6, 7]. However PLD-A is insufficient to create strong
correlations. Figure 5b shows that the range-limited cases of MED in µ = 3, 4 (purple and
cyan lines) are close to the case of RLD-A (red line). Although there is no clear criteria
for the value of r in order to be an onion-like network with necessary positive degree-degree
correlations, too large r is unsuitable [21]. We do not discuss the optimally robust onion
structure, but concern about incrementally growing proper good onion-like networks self-
organized by natural and reasonable attachments. From Figs. 3 4 and 5, our networks by
RLD-A and MED in µ = 3, 4 for m = 4 have onion-like structure with both high R and r,
but other cases are not. Moreover, they have efficient small-world property [23]: the average
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FIG. 6: Average path length on the shortest paths counted by hops in our growing networks by
RLD-A. The purple and blue thin lines guide O(log(N)) as the small-world effect. These results
are averaged over 100 samples.
shortest path length is O(log(N)) as shown in Fig. 6, even though half links in RLD-A or
MED are created by random attachment without intention to be efficiency. In the growing
from the initial complete graph, the number µ ≈ 3 of intermediations is at the similar level
of the average path length. Averagely the length of simple one-round loop (as shown in
Fig. 1a, it consists of the path between blue and green nodes + the corresponding blue
and green links) generated by the pair of RLD-A or MED becomes short and inexpensive
as O(log(N)).
IV. VIRTUAL TEST FOR PROSPECTIVE GROWTH OF REAL NETWORKS
As a virtual test for exploring future design of networks, we study the robustness of our
model in growing to onion-like structure from the initial configuration of real networks[26]
in Table I. For these social and technological networks, long distance connections will be
somewhat required in order to seek solution strategies to undeveloped relationship or in-
convenience, and realizable by intermediation or investment (e.g. for low cost carrier or
innovation of power transmission) in a trade-off between the benefit and the cost.
This network design in growth is different task from healing or recovering by rewirings
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TABLE I: Basic data of the real networks after converting from each of them to an undirected
graph without multiple links. USair and USpower are abbreviations of US Airport Network and
US Power Grid, respectively. The average path length and diameter are defined by the averaged
length of the shortest paths with the minimum number of hops between two nodes and the longest
length in a network.
Network N0 M0 〈k〉 = 2M0/N0 Ave. path len. Diameter
Facebook 1899 13838 14.573 3.055 8
USair 1574 17215 21.874 3.115 8
USpower 4941 6594 2.669 18.989 46
e.g. between second neighbors [4, 16] in almost constant numbers of nodes and links for a
damaged network by earthquakes or terrorist attacks, etc. Because we focus on a structural
change of network from almost uncorrelated SF to onion-like without hubs in the growth
rather than topologically partial changes by rewirings. We also investigate dependence of
the initial network structure not complete graph and the initial size N0 on the robustness
and degree-degree correlations for our growing method. Of course, some investments may be
required for the growing network in larger size than the initial real one, however the virtual
test will give a prospective insight.
In the following, the cases of intermediately destructive CI3 attacks and not very effec-
tive PLD-A are omitted to simplified the discussion. Figures 7ab and 8ab show that high
robustness against both HDA and BP attacks is obtained with increasing to R > 0.3 from
R ≈ 0.1 in initial vulnerable real networks of Facebook and USair. In Figs. 7ce and 8ce,
the cases of m = 10 and m = 12 are investigated for checking the emergence of onion-like
structure with high assortativity r > 0.2. We remark that some range-limited cases of MED
in µ = 3 intermediations (bluish lines) have higher R than the cases of RLD-A with the
attachments to the furthest nodes, but the effect is weak in the cases of MED in µ = 2
intermediations. If we do not insist onion-like networks, USpower can be already grown
with high robustness before around N ≈ 10000 of double size of the initial as shown in
Figs. 7de and 8de. It suggests a possibility for incrementally growing other robust networks
with r < 0 or r ≈ 0 (see Fig. 9de) instead of onion-like networks. Figure 9abc shows the
enhancing of degree-degree correlations in increasing values of r in the growth of Facebook
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a) Facebook for m = 4 b) US Airport Network for m = 4
c) Facebook for m = 10 d) US power grid for m = 4
e) US power grid for m = 12
FIG. 7: Drastically improved robustness against HDA attacks in growing networks from the initial
configuration of real networks. Robustness index R vs N in the growing networks from the initial
a) Facebook for m = 4, b) US Airport Network for m = 4, c) Facebook for m = 10, d) US power
grid for m = 4, and e) US power grid for m = 12.
or USair. However, different behavior of late increasing after decreasing to negative cor-
relations is obtained in USpower as shown in Fig. 9de. Some sort of structural change is
occurred in the growth. The reason may be from that USpower includes chain-like parts
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a) Facebook for m = 4 b) US Airport Network for m = 4
c) Facebook for m = 10 d) US power grid for m = 4
e) US power grid for m = 12
FIG. 8: Drastically improved robustness against BP attacks in growing networks from the initial
configuration of real networks. Robustness index R vs N in the growing networks from the initial
a) Facebook for m = 4, b) US Airport Network for m = 4, c) Facebook for m = 10, d) US power
grid for m = 4, and e) US power grid for m = 4 and m = 12.
which induce large diameter, while Facebook and USair are compact with small diameter in
Table I. We note that the average path length is monotonously increasing to 4.13 and 4.21
at N = 10000 in Facebook and USair, but decreasing to 4.97 at N = 40000 in USpower.
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a) Facebook for m = 4 b) US Airport Network for m = 4
c) Facebook for m = 10 d) US power grid for m = 4
e) US power grid for m = 12
FIG. 9: Assortativity r vs N in growing networks from the initial a) Facebook for m = 4, b) US
Airport Network for m = 4, c) Facebook for m = 10, d) US Power Grid for m = 4, and e) US
Power Grid for m = 12.
These distributions of path lengths are bell-shaped with the peak around the average length
for each size N . In addition, the average path length in USpower is substantially greater
than the number µ of intermediations at least in the early stage of the growth as shown in
Table I.
14
a) Facebook and US Airport Network b) US Power Grid
FIG. 10: Average degree 〈k〉 vs N in the growing networks from the initial a) Facebook for m = 4
and m = 10 and US Airport Network for m = 4, b) US Power Grid for m = 4 and m = 12.
From Figs. 7, 8, 9, onion-like structure with both high R and r emerges by RLD-A
or MED for µ ≥ 3 intermediations in the growing from Facebook for m = 10, USair for
m = 4, and USpower for m = 12. The growth to onion-like networks needs more steps as
the initial size N0 is larger in comparison of Facebook or USair and USpower. We remark
that the effect of degree-degree correlations on the robustness works well in the early stage
of the growth with structural change from real networks, however the robustness index R
is saturated in N > 6000 in Figs. 7abc and 8abc and in N > 20000 in Figs. 7de and 8de
for increasing assortativity r with enhancing the correlations in Fig. 9. It is also interesting
that the robustness in Figs. 7 and 8 is improved in spite of decreasing average degree 〈k〉
in the growing from Facebook and USair for m = 4 (red and purple lines) as shown in Fig.
10a. Note that the average degree approaches to 2×m for N →∞ in Fig. 10.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a second method for incrementally growing strongly robust onion-
like networks self-organized by more natural and reasonable pair of attachments than the
copying model [6, 7]. In addition, it becomes robust even in the early stage of the growth,
and there is no huge hub whose largest degree is bounded. Since random attachments
make an exponential degree distribution [2], the random ones are dominant in the tail for
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high degrees, while another intermediated attachments mainly work for low degrees and the
positive correlations among them. In a virtual test for the growing from real networks with
extreme vulnerability, we have shown that the proposed growing networks have reformable
robustness to be future prospective infrastructures. It is also expected that the range-limited
intermediations in a few hops reduce the Euclidean distances of links embedded on a space.
We emphasize the emergence of robust onion-like networks in enhancing moderately long
loops by range-limited MED in a few hops without both degrading efficiency of paths and
large connection costs or efforts. We should remember that the coexistence of robustness
and efficiency has not been realized in many real networks, and the threat against attacks
[11, 12] is never decreased rather increased more and more, unless the dependence on selfish
preferential attachment [2] is changed by ourselves. Therefore, our study suggests that
we should discontinue the dependence on selfish rule and develop the potential of distant
connections for the half of links, which may mean necessary investment for highly reliable
connectivity in our network infrastructures even against intelligent attacks.
Acknowledgments
The author express appreciation to anonymous reviewers and the web site noted in foot-
note for their valuable comments and using dataset of real networks. This research was
supported in part by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP.17H01729.
[1] Albert, R., Jeong, H. & Baraba´si, A.-L. Error and attack tolerance of complex networks,
Nature 406, pp.378-381 (2000).
[2] Baraba´si, A.-L., Albert, R. & Jeong, H. Mean-filed theory for scale-free random networks,
Physica A 272, pp.173-187 (1999).
[3] Ercsey-Ravasz, M., Lichtenwalter, R., Chawla, N.V. & Toroczkai, Z. Range-limited Centrality
Measures in Complex Networks, Phy. Rev. E 85(6), pp.066103 (2012).
[4] Gallos, L.K., Fefferman, N.H., Simple and efficient self-healing strategy for damaged complex
networks, Phy. Rev. E 92, 052806 (2015).
[5] Hashimoto, K. Zeta Functions of Finite Graphs and Representations of p-adic Graphs, Adv.
16
Stud. Pure Math. 15, pp.211-280 (1989).
[6] Hayashi, Y. Growing Self-organized Design of Efficient and Robust Complex Networks, IEEE
Xplore Dig. Lib. SASO 2014 doi:10.1109/SASO.2014.17 50-59, arXiv:1411.7719 (2014).
[7] Hayashi, Y. Spatially self-organized resilient networks by a distributed cooperative mechanism,
Physica A 457, pp.255-269 (2016).
[8] Karp, R.M. Reducibility among combinatorial problems, In Miller, E., Thatcher, J.W. &
Bohlinger, J.D. eds. Complexity of Computations, pp.85-103, Plenum Press, New York (1972).
[9] Kempe, D., Kleinberg, J. & Tardos, E. Maximizing the spread of influence through a social
network, In Proc. 9th ACM SIGKDD, Int. Conf. on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining,
pp.137-143 (2003).
[10] Hayashi, Y. Asymptotic behavior of the node degrees in the ensemble aver-
age of adjacency matrix, N etwork Science 4(3), pp.385-399 (2016), Open Access
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/network-science/open-access
[11] Morone, F. & Makse, H.A. Influence maximization in complex networks through
optimal percolation, Nature 524, pp.65-68 (2015). Supplementary Information
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v524/n7563/extref/nature14604-s1.pdf
[12] Mugisha, S. & Zhou, H.-J. Identifying optimal targets of network attack by belief propagation,
Phy. Rev. E 94, pp.012305 (2016).
[13] Newman, M.E.J. Assortative Mixing in Networks, Phy. Rev. Lett. 89, pp.208701 (2003).
[14] Nishiguchi, T. & Beaudet, A. Case Study The Toyota Group and the Aisin Fire, Sloan Maneg.
Rev. 40:1, pp.49-59 (1998).
[15] Nishiguchi, T. Global Neighborhoods -Strategies of Successful Organizational Networks- (in
Japanese), NTT Publishing (2007). http://hitotsubashiiir-en.blogspot.jp/2012/12/researcher-
profile-nishiguchi-toshihiro.html
[16] Park, J. & Hahn, S.G. Bypass rewiring and robustness of complex networks, Phy. Rev. E 94,
pp.022310 (2016).
[17] Radicchi, F. & Castellano, C. Beyond the locally treelike approximation for percolation on
real networks, Phy. Rev. E 93, pp.030302(R) (2016).
[18] Sampaio Filho, C.I.N., Moreira, A.A., Andrade, R.S.F., Herrmann, H.J. & Andrade Jr S.S.
Mandara Networks: ultra-small-world and highly sparse graphs, Science Reports 5:9082
(2015).
17
[19] Saxenian, A. The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy, Harvard Uni-
versity Press (2007).
[20] Schneider, C.M., Moreira, A.A., Andrade Jr ,S.S., Havlin, S. & Herrmann, H.J. Mitigation of
malicious attacks on networks, PNAS 108, pp.3838-3841 (2011).
[21] Tanizawa, T., Havlin, S. & Stanley, H.E. Robustness of onion-like correlated networks against
targeted attacks, Phys. Rev. E 85, pp.046109 (2012).
[22] Vazirani, V.V. Approximation Algorithms, Chapter 6 Feedback Vertex Set, pp.54-60, Springer-
Verlag Berlin Heidelberg (2001).
[23] Watts, D.J. & Strogatz, S.H. Collective dynamics of ’small-world’ networks, Nature 393,
pp.440-442 (1998).
[24] Wu, Z.-X. & Holme, P. Onion structure and network robustness, Phys. Rev. E 84, pp.026106
(2011).
[25] Zhou, H.-J. Spin glass approach to the feedback vertex set problem, Eur. Phys. J.B 86:455,
(2013).
[26] http://toreopsahl.com/datasets/
Appendix
We briefly summarize the theoretical background of CI and BP.
For CI according to [11], we consider the optimal immunization to prevent disease or
information spreading. This is mapped onto the breakdown problem as minimizing the size
of GC of a network. In the GC after removing a fraction q of nodes, there are two states
represented by the quantity ni = 1 or ni = 0: node i exists or not. The fraction q is denoted
by q = 1− 1
N
∑N
i=1 ni.
The probability νi→j for information spreading is computed in self-consistency through
the following message passing equations
νi→j = ni
[
1−Πk∈∂i\j(1− νk→i)
]
, (1)
where ∂i denotes node i’s set of connecting neighbor nodes, and ∂i\j is the node subset
obtained by removing node j from ∂i. Since the stability condition at the fixed point of
origin for the iterated map of Eq. (1) is given by that the largest eigenvalue λ(n; q) of the
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Jacobian matrix
∂νi→j
∂νk→l
∣∣∣∣
νi→j=0
= niBk→l,i→j
is less than one, to find the minimum set of immunization nodes is equivalent to select the
minimum set of removed nodes until satisfying λ(n; q) = 1. Here, Bk→l,i→j is an element of
2M × 2M non-backtracking (NB) matrix [5] for the network. At the critical λ(n; qc) = 1,
the GC is broken.
Moreover, according to Power Method, we have
λ(n; q) = lim
l→∞
[
|wl(n)|
|w0|
]1/l
, (2)
wl(n) denotes the vector at the l-th iterations by multiplying the Jacobian matrix for an
initial arbitrary nonzero vector w0. The elements of 2M dimensional vectors wl(n) and w0
are for bidirectional i→ j and j → i links. The denominator |w0| in the right-hand side of
Eq. (2) is constant and independent of the set {ni}. The numerator is approximated by the
following expression corresponding to 2l-body problem.
|wl(n)|
2 ≈
N∑
i=1
(ki − 1)
∑
j∈∂Ball(i,2l−1)
(
Πk∈P2l−1(i,j)nk
)
(kj − 1), (3)
where P2l−1(i, j) is the set of nodes belonging to the shortest path of length 2l−1 connecting
i and j nodes, ∂Ball(i, l) denotes the set of nodes on the frontier of the ball with radius l
hops from node i, ki and kj denotes the degrees of nodes i and j. We remark the factor
Πknk = 1 in the parenthesis in the right-hand side of Eq. (3) when all nodes on the shortest
path are not absence, then the path is connected. The above approximation can be extended
to the case of even length path to ∂Ball(i, 2l). Thus, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , the expression in
the right-hand side of Eq. (3) gives
CIl(i)
def
= (ki − 1)
∑
j∈∂Ball(i,l)
(kj − 1). (4)
This approximation of CI in l hops is categorized in range-limited approach. Thus, the
scalable algorithm for calculating CIl(i) is based on the minimization of the energy of a
many-body system, which is equivalent to find the principal part of connectivity as the
minimal set of nodes that minimize the largest eigenvalue λ(n, q). The critical transition
of the eigenvalue of the NB matrix from one to zero is caused as the network consists of
a single loop is changed to a tree by a node removal eventually. Once it becomes a tree,
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fragmentation to large components occurs by any node removal. When a network includes
more than one loops, the eigenvalue is greater than one. Thus, it has been pointed out that
the best attack strategy is to destroy the loops [11](Supplementary Information). Note that
the NB matrix is intrinsic for enumerating the number of loops on a length basis in Zeta
function of graphs [5].
For BP according to [25], it is assumed that nodes j ∈ ∂i are mutually independent of
each other when node i is removed. Such approximated tree-like graph is called as cavity
graph. We consider the marginal probability qAii for the state Ai of node i. Since Ai represent
the index of root node of i, it is influenced by the neighboring nodes in the cavity graph after
removing node i denoted by \i. Based on the product of independent marginal probability
q
Aj
j→i for the state Aj , we consider the joint probability
P\i(Aj : j ∈ ∂i) ≈ Πj∈∂iq
Aj
j→i.
In the cavity graph, if all nodes j ∈ ∂i are either empty (Aj = 0) or roots (Aj = j), the
added node i can be a root (Ai = i). There are the following exclusive states.
1. Ai = 0: i is empty (removed). Since i is unnecessary as a root, it belongs to FVS.
2. Ai = i: i becomes its own root.
The state Aj = j of j ∈ ∂i is changeable to Aj = i when node i is added.
3. Ai = k: one node k ∈ ∂i becomes the root of i when it is added, if k is occupied and
all other j ∈ ∂i are either empty or roots.
The corresponding probabilities to the above states are
q0i
def
=
1
zi
, (5)
qii
def
=
exΠj∈∂i(t)
[
q0j→i + q
j
j→i
]
zi
,
qki
def
=
ex
(1−q0
k→i
)
q0
k→i
+qk
k→i
Πj∈∂i(t)
[
q0j→i + q
j
j→i
]
zi
,
q0i→j =
1
zi→j(t)
, (6)
qii→j =
exΠk∈∂i(t)\j
[
q0k→i + q
k
k→i
]
zi→j(t)
, (7)
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where ∂i(t) denotes node i’s set of connecting neighbor nodes at time t, and x > 0 is a
parameter of inverse temperature. We have the normalization constant
zi
def
= 1 + ex

1 + ∑
k∈∂i(t)
1− q0k→i
q0k→i + q
k
k→i

Πj∈∂i(t) [q0j→i + qjj→i] , (8)
zi→j(t)
def
= 1 + exΠk∈∂i(t)\j
[
q0k→i + q
k
k→i
]
×

1 + ∑
l∈∂i(t)\j
1− q0l→i
q0l→i + q
l
l→i

 , (9)
to be satisfied for any i and i→ j as
q0i + q
i
i +
∑
k∈∂i
qki = 1,
q0i→j + q
i
i→j +
∑
k∈∂i
qki→j = 1.
In BP attacks with sudden breakdown [12] which gives severer damages than CI and hub
attacks, the node deletion process also focus on the destroy of loops, since the FVS of graph
G is a subset of nodes such that if all the nodes of this set and the attached links are removed
from G the remaining graph will have no loops [25]. A node with the highest q0i is chosen as
the removed target at each time step t that consists of a number of rounds by the updating
calculations of Eqs. (5)-(9) in order of random permutation of nodes 1 ∼ N .
On the other hand in computer science, to find a suitable node for removing and in-
serting into FVS, the largest node of its degree deg(v) minus the number comp(G − v) of
connecting components formed by removing the node v is recursively chosen in an approx-
imation algorithm [22]. When several links connect to a component, pairs of these links
form loops through v. Then the number of them (precisely the number −1) is not decreased
from its degree. The most subtracted case is only one link connects to a component, then
deg(v)−comp(G−v) becomes 0. Thus, deg(v)−comp(G−v) is considered as a characteristic
index to delete loops as many as possible. However, this heuristic approximation method
requires large computation.
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